Abusing Dalvik Beyond Recognition

Jurriaan Bremer

Abusing Dalvik Beyond Recognition




Who?

Jurriaan Bremer

- Freelance Security Researcher
- Student (University of Amsterdam)
- Interested in Mobile Security & Low-level stuff
 - Core Developer of Cuckoo Sandbox (<u>http://cuckoosandbox.org/</u>)
 - Author of Open Source ARMv7 Disassembler (<u>http://darm.re/</u>)
 - Blog (<u>http://jbremer.org/</u>)
- Eindbazen CTF Team, The Honeynet Project



What?



Abusing Dalvik Beyond Recognition



Why?

- Broken stuff is good stuff
- New ways to mess with analysis
- Break analysis tools
- To have fun.. 🙂



Android Introduction

- Android phones (usually) run ARMv7
- Based on a heavily modified Linux kernel
- An application is an APK a Zip file
 - Contains metadata: signatures, android manifest, etc
 Code, Images, Data, ..
- Applications' code
 - Mainly written in Java, but may contain native cod
 - Dalvik: Android's Java Virtual Machine
 - All code goes in to classes.dex (the Dex file format)



Dex File Format

Header
string_ids
type_ids
proto_ids
field_ids
method_ids
class_defs
data
link_data

- Simple File Header
- Various Data Pools
 - Compact Data Structures
 - Fixed-length lookup tables
 - Represent one thing each
 - Strings, Data Types
 - Field/Method definition
- Data section
 - Variable-length information
 - E.g., the actual Dalvik code

Abusing Dalvik Beyond Recognition



Dex File Format: Strings

Header
string_ids
type_ids
proto_ids
field_ids
method_ids
class_defs
data
link_data

	string_id_item = in string_id pool						
	string_id_ite	em:					
	string_data_o	ff	u	int			
	<pre>string_data_item = in data section</pre>						
	string_data_item:						
utf16_size			ULEB128				
	utf16_size		ULEB1	28			
	utf16_size data		ULEB1 ubyte[utf16_si				
	data	ct storage		ze]			
UI	data	U	ubyte[utf16_si	ze]			
UI	data _EB128: Compac	U	ubyte[utf16_si for small 32-bit ints	ze]			

Oxffffffff 5 bytes (Oxff Oxff Oxff Oxff Oxof)




DexOpt

Strict verifier of the Dex File Format

- Enforces a lot of rules
 - See the Dex specification

Both documented & undocumented E.g., manual states map_list is optional – it's not.

(http://source.android.com/devices/tech/dalvik/dex-format.html)



Abusing Dalvik Beyond Recognition



DexOpt

Many strict rules, including, e.g.:

- No more padding than required
 - Extra byte of padding? Shame on you!
- Padding must consist of zeroes only
- Entries in the Data Pools must be **unique**
 - May not define the same string twice
- Entries in the Data Pools must be **sorted**
 - string "a" comes before string "b"
 - type 42 comes before type 1337



Dalvik 101

public static void hello() {

System.out.println("Hello Hack.lu");

sget-object v0, System;->out:PrintStream; const-string v1, "Hello Hack.lu" invoke-virtual v0, v1, PrintStream;->println(String;)V return-void

Abusing Dalvik Beyond Recognition

}



Dalvik 102

- Register-based Instruction Set
 - Allocates a fixed-size amount of registers for a function
 - More efficient than Java's stack-based instruction set
- Various General Purpose Instructions

Move, add, subtract, multiply, etc

• Fixed branches

No "jump register", only "goto \$+30" and alike

- Class, Static and Array get/put instructions

 To read/write class members & array indices
- Special: Switch/case, array-length, const-string, ..



DexOpt Continued

Strict verification of **Dalvik Bytecode**

- All branches must point to valid Bytecode
 - Checks for out-of-bounds code access

• Type checking

- Objects can't do arithmetic
- Strings can't perform the "array-length" instruction
- Can't "invoke-static" a virtual method
- Argument count & types must match prototypes
 - E.g., prototype (Lfoo;II)V requires 3 parameters (One foo object and two integers – method has no return value.)



"Parser Differentials"

- Term coined by Meredith Patterson, Len Sassaman, Sergey Bratus et al
 - N parsers with 1 input, 1..N different interpretations
 - Parser/Docs inconsistency leads to "funny" stuff
- map_list is a Parser Differential
 - Not a very interesting one though..
 - Hint hint.. ;-)



Straight from the Documentation

access_flags Definitions

embedded in class_def_item, encoded_field, encoded_method, and InnerClass

Bitfields of these flags are used to indicate the accessibility and overall properties of classes and class members.

Name	Value	For Classes (and InnerClass annotations)	For Fields	For Methods
ACC_PUBLIC	0x1	public: visible everywhere	public: visible everywhere	public: visible everywhere
ACC_PRIVATE	0x2	* private: only visible to defining class	private: only visible to defining class	private: only visible to defining class

[..]

(unused)	0x8000	
ACC_CONSTRUCTOR	0x10000	constructor method (class or instance initializer)
ACC_DECLARED_ SYNCHRONIZED	0x20000	declared synchronized. Note: This has no effect on execution (other than in reflection of this flag, per se).

Abusing Dalvik Beyond Recognition



"Parser Diff..WAIT WHAT?!?!"

libdex/DexFile.h:

 $= 0 \times 00004000$, ACC ENUM // class, field, ic (1.5) ACC CONSTRUCTOR = 0×00010000 , // method (Dalvik only) ACC_DECLARED_SYNCHRONIZED = 0x00020000, // method (Dalvik only) ACC CLASS MASK = (ACC PUBLIC | ACC FINAL | ACC INTERFACE | ACC ABSTRACT ACC SYNTHETIC | ACC ANNOTATION | ACC ENUM),

oo/Object.h:

};

/* unlike the others, these can be present in the optimized DEX file */ CLASS ISOPTIMIZED = (1<<17), // class may contain opt instrs CLASS ISPREVERIFIED = (1<<16), // class has been pre-verified /* bits we can reasonably expect to see set in a DEX access flags field */ #define EXPECTED FILE FLAGS \ (ACC_CLASS_MASK | CLASS_ISPREVERIFIED | CLASS_ISOPTIMIZED)

Abusing Dalvik **Beyond Recognition**



Dex vs ODex


- ODex Optimized Dex Files
 - Created after verifying Dex file
 - Various optimizations (CPU-wise)
- Our Dex is not an ODex file
 - CLASS_ISOPTIMIZED | CLASS_ISPREVERIFIED
 - Well, thanks, eh?
- libdex doesn't verify Dex vs ODex
 - To be continued.



Now what?

We can mark a class "verified & optimized"

• DexOpt will then.. set a status field:



• Followed by a check:



Abusing Dalvik Beyond Recognition



Abuse ALL the Dalvik

- We can now write not-so-strict Dalvik
 - For all methods of a particular class
 - No verification 🙂
 - Just set the class' access_flags
- Possibilities in Dalvik
 - Write "special" sequences of instructions
 - Normally rejected during validation
 - Use instructions available for ODex
 - Optimized instructions



Goal: Run arbitrary Dalvik

- Input: Raw Dalvik Bytecode
 - Most Dalvik instructions take {1..5} ushort's
 - Use a string with unicode "characters" (Bytecode)
 - Each character represented as UTF-16 "code point"
 - UTF-16 code points are 16-bits like an ushort
- Task: Redirect Dalvik's Program Counter
 To the string with our Bytecode
- Output: The return value
 - After executing our raw Dalvik Bytecode 😳



Some Gadgets

We're going to require some basic stuff

Object address leak

- What is the address of our Object?

• Read arbitrary integer

- What is the value at this address?

• Write arbitrary integer

– Your address now contains my value! 🙂

Abusing Dalvik Beyond Recognition



Gadgets: Object Address Leak

Can simply **cast** an Object as **integer** (Now Type Checking is disabled \bigcirc)

// Invalid Java code, but closest estimation
// to our Bytecode
int address(Object obj) {
 return (int) obj;

Abusing Dalvik Beyond Recognition

ł



Gadgets: Read Arbitrary Integer

• We use the "array-length" instruction

- Arrays, e.g., int[] foo = new int[42];

- Arrays in Dalvik have their length at offset +8
- Our read_int32 function
 - Subtract 8 from the address
 - Perform "array-length" on our address
 - Return the "length"



Gadgets: Write Arbitrary Integer

- Usage of "iput-quick" instruction
 - iput = Instance Put, set a field of an instance object
 - E.g., this.foo = bar;
 - **v0** = bar, **v1** = this \rightarrow
 - iput v0, v1, SomeClass;->foo:I
- Quick is the ODex version
 - iput-quick v0, v1, **#+4**
 - #+4 is the offset of field foo from this
 - Can overwrite any "field" with iput-quick



Strings in Java

- String is a wrapper around char[]
 - *(u32 *)(str + 8) = pointer to char[]
 - (u16 *)(char[] + 16) = UTF-16 code points
- E.g., given string "Hack.lu \u1337"
 UTF-16 code points will look like:

5 py -c 'print u"Hack.lu \u1337".encode("utf-16le")'|xxd 0000000: 4800 6100 6300 6b00 2e00 6c00 7500 2000 H.a.c.k...l.u.

Abusing Dalvik Beyond Recognition

00010: 3713



7.

Executing Arbitrary Dalvik

- We want to execute our Dalvik String
- Override the address of a virtual function
- Class layout:
 - *(u32 *)(this + 0) = clazz object
 - *(u32 *)(clazz + 112) = vtable_count
 - *(u32 *)(clazz + 116) = vtable_pointer
- All classes inherit *java.lang.Object*
 - Which defines a couple of virtual methods itself
- We create a custom class with 1 virtual method

 Our virtual method is located at index vtable_count-1



Executing Arbitrary Dalvik

- vtable: pointers to Method instances
- vm/mterp/armv5te/footer.S:

LinvokeArgsDone: @ r0=methodToCall ldrh r9, [r0, #offMethod_registersSize] @ r9<- methodToCall->regsSize ldrh r3, [r0, #offMethod_outsSize] @ r3<- methodToCall->outsSize ldr r2, [r0, #offMethod_insns] @ r2<- method->insns

vm/mterp/common/asm-constants.h:

MTERP_OFFSET(offMethod_registersSize, Method, registersSize, 10) MTERP_OFFSET(offMethod_outsSize, Method, outsSize, 12) MTERP_OFFSET(offMethod_name, Method, name, 16) MTERP_OFFSET(offMethod_insns, Method, insns, 32)

• Pointer to Dalvik Bytecode at offset 32



Quick Pwn Summary

• Get an arbitrary String

Locate its UTF-16 code points (our Bytecode)

- Create Object of a Class with a virtual method
 - Get last vtable entry
 - Overwrite Insns with the address to our Bytecode
- Call the virtual method:
 - v0 = object instance

– invoke-virtual {v0}, SomeClass;->dummy_method



Demo o'clock

- Our Bytecode should return gracefully
 - (It's too easy to crash the emulator at this point..)
 - We can even get its return value \odot
- Made a simple Application
 - With a textbox, waiting for Bytecode
 - A fancy button
 - Shows the return value of the executed Bytecode
 - Represented as integer below the button



Demo Time 😳

Abusing Dalvik Beyond Recognition



Bytecode Examples

- \$ py dalvik.py '0013 0539 000f'
- 0 const/16 v0, **#0x539**
- 2 return v0
- \$ py dalvik.py '0013 0539 00d8 0300 000f'
- 0 const/16 v0, **#0x539**
- 2 add-int/lit8 v0, v0, **#+3**
- 4 return v0

Abusing Dalvik Beyond Recognition



Real usage?

- We can put any Bytecode we want
 - Including invalid Bytecode (just don't invoke it)
 - Breaks commonly used tools, big time
 - Exercise for the reader
- We can run arbitrary Dalvik Bytecode
 - No need to hardcode all our proprietary code
 - Prevent easy analysis of your Application
 - Because decompiling "normal" Dalvik into Java is damn easy



Future Work

Native Code Execution

- (Directly from within Dalvik, naturally)
- Definitely possible, but requires some work..
- Need to allocate RWX memory or use ROP
 - Will probably want to parse /proc/self/maps
 - Locate mmap() or mprotect()
- Set ACC_STATIC in access_flags for virtual method

– Allows to jump to arbitrary ARMv7 code $\textcircled{\odot}$



Future Work

- Self-decrypting Dalvik Bytecode
 - Don't run the entire Dalvik string right away
 - Pass only chunks mutate parts on-the-go
 - Whatever you can think of..?
- Obfuscate the memory corruption gadgets
 - Right now it's pretty obvious..
- Exploit other built-in classes & features
- Modify the Dalvik VM itself
 - Facebook "extended" the Dalvik VM for >64k methods

(invoke-* instructions normally take a 16-bit index.)



For fun: execute-inline

• Optimizations of a few dozen functions, e.g.:

{ javaLangString_charAt, "Ljava/lang/String;", "charAt", "(I)C" },
{ javaLangString_compareTo, "Ljava/lang/String;", "compareTo", "(Ljava/lang/String;)I" },
{ javaLangString_equals, "Ljava/lang/String;", "equals", "(Ljava/lang/Object;)Z" },
{ javaLangString_fastIndexOf_II, "Ljava/lang/String;", "fastIndexOf", "(II)I" },
{ javaLangString_isEmpty, "Ljava/lang/String;", "isEmpty", "()Z" },
{ javaLangString_length, "Ljava/lang/String;", "length", "()I" },

- execute-inline {v0, v1, v2}, 42@inline
- Doesn't do bounds checking
- Table is close to GOT
 - Exposes some functions, e.g., **memcpy**, **mmap** :p



For Fun: invoke-super-quick

- Invokes the *super* method for a virtual method
- Takes a bit more time to setup
 - Create a class A with a virtual method
 - Create a class **B** which inherits class **A**
 - Overwrite Insns address for A's virtual method
 - Call A's virtual method from B's with super
- More awesome 😳
 - Doesn't invoke a virtual method
 - Invokes a *super quick* method $\textcircled{\odot}\textcircled{\odot}$



Patch by Ben Gruver (JesusFreke) (PoC still works on Android 4.3?!)

\$ git show c2e9a5b2b70d69c

commit c2e9a5b2b70d69c027964c9a4d07a4bdf723dd36 Author: Ben Gruver <bgruv@google.com> Date: Wed May 8 13:29:36 2013 -0700

```
Move verification of class access flags to libdex
```

```
Change-Id: I020a168cfff46e319b0bebb6c7477f0b4139c6de
```

```
diff --git a/libdex/DexSwapVerify.cpp b/libdex/DexSwapVerify.cpp
index 24a86f9..2bb403e 100644
--- a/libdex/DexSwapVerify.cpp
+++ b/libdex/DexSwapVerify.cpp
@@ -911,6 +911,11 @@ static void* swapClassDefItem(const CheckState* state, void* ptr) {
    SWAP_OFFSET4(item->annotationsOff);
    SWAP_OFFSET4(item->classDataOff);
+ if ((item->accessFlags & ~ACC_CLASS_MASK) != 0) {
```

```
ALOGE("Bogus class access flags %x", item->accessFlags);
return NULL;
```

return item + 1;

Abusing Dalvik Beyond Recognition



The End.



Abusing Dalvik Beyond Recognition



The Real End 😳



Jurriaan Bremer me@jbremer.org @skier_t

Thanks to: Alexandre Dulaunoy, Patrick Schulz, Rodrigo Chiossi, Sergey Bratus, Valentin Pistol, ShiftReduce, Thomas Schreck, Peter Geissler, Eindbazen CTF Team

Abusing Dalvik Beyond Recognition

